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 FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR AUSTRALIAN LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Australian public sector agencies at local, state and national levels have undergone a period of 
intense change as strategies to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, appropriateness and value 
for money of their services have been undertaken.  In this light, performance measurement 
systems and the development of performance indicators are now receiving attention from 
regulatory authorities, governments, and other stakeholders.  However, academic input and 
associated debate has been limited.  This paper considers the key dimensions of financial status 
and performance of local governments. It is argued that the general purpose financial reports 
prepared under AAS 27 do not provide all of the information necessary to evaluate the financial 
performance of local governments.  In particular, it is argued that the treatment of capital 
contributions, and the notion of intergenerational equity are elements which have been neglected 
in the published literature.  This research would be of interest to local government regulatory 
agencies, practitioners, accounting standard setting bodies and all those interested in local 
government performance and accountability. 
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FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR AUSTRALIAN LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The public sector in Australia has undergone a period of change at Commonwealth, State and 
local government levels.   The managerialist reforms of the 1980s, with their focus on efficiency 
questions, cost savings, and streamlining of operations, replaced a traditional emphasis on inputs 
(compliance with spending mandates), with a focus on outputs and outcomes (results and 
performance) (Gray and Jenkins, 1985).  This philosophy, and accompanying reforms, resulted 
in a changing emphasis from process accountability to performance accountability.  However, 
the exact extent and nature of performance accountability is still the subject of debate (Parker 
and Gould, 1999; Parker and Guthrie, 1993; Gray and Jenkins, 1993; Pollitt, 1990; Midwinter 
and Monaghan, 1995).  One feature of performance accountability that has received growing 
attention is the development of performance indicators.  Performance indicators are quantitative 
or qualitative measures of key relationships within an organisation and are used in both private 
sector and public sector organisations.  Private sector performance indicators have been 
developed and refined over a long period of time and there is a group of measures that are well 
recognised and commonly used in that context.  They are predominantly financial measures 
(Giacomino and Mielke, 1993; Juchan and Ross, 1994), although the use of non-financial 
measures is gaining recognition (Kaplan and Norton, 1992).  However, differences exist in the 
operating environments and objectives between private sector entities and public sector agencies. 
 Public sector agencies are subject to political influences and the need to perform community 
service obligations.  Moreover, most public sector agencies do not exist to make a profit.  As a 
consequence, there is a need to develop performance indicators that recognise the unique 
characteristics of public sector agencies and the diversity in the types of those agencies, and not 
merely transfer private sector indicators over to the public sector (ASCPA, forthcoming).   
 
There are approximately 700 local councils across Australia, in 7 State jurisdictions, with a wide 
diversity in size, population, revenue and expenditure (Industry Commission, 1997).  The context 
in which these local governments operate has been influenced by the reform processes under 
way.  All councils must address the implementation of national competition policy, some 
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councils have been restructured, many have made greater use of competitive tendering and 
contracting, while others have separated their roles as purchasers and providers of services 
(Industry Commission 1997, p. 4). Although the reform process is not uniform across local 
governments, with some jurisdictions experiencing far more wide-reaching reform than others, 
most local governments have changed from government bureaucracies to more market driven 
service providers (Kloot, 1999).  Many councils have viewed the development of performance 
indicators as an integral part of these contextual changes.  Further, state regulatory agencies 
(Departments of Local Government or their equivalent), and local government associations 
representing councils have shown an interest in the development and reporting of performance 
indicators for councils (see for example the benchmarking study for NSW local governments).  
At a national level, the Local Government Ministers’ Conference has agreed that national 
performance indicators should be developed as part of a strategy aimed at “improving the 
efficiency, effectiveness and appropriateness of local government services so as to give better 
value for money for the community" (Industry Commission 1997, p. 77).  However, the task of 
developing meaningful indicators has proved difficult, due to significant differences between 
local governments within each state and across Australia.  The development of national 
indicators has been suspended pending the outcome of a review by the Industry Commission.  
There is currently a great diversity in the number and type of performance indicators reported in 
the annual reports of Australian local governments. 
 
To date, the focus of attention of performance measurement has been on improved service 
delivery, and in particular on cost reduction of services.  The academic community has 
participated in the broader aspects of the performance measurement debate.  The ‘unintended 
consequences’ of measurement have been highlighted, as have the problems of making some 
aspects of government activity ‘visible’ through the measurement process (see for example, 
Broadbent, 1995). As the future success and value of local government to local communities will 
be largely determined by the level and the source of the available financial resources that local 
government bodies have at their disposal, financial performance is fundamentally important 
(Kloot and Martin, 2000).  Fiscal capacity and financial viability are of central importance to 
local government.  Successful financial management of a local authority ultimately depends on 
the ability of that authority to plan ahead, and to adjust its revenue and expenditure plans to 
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reflect changes over time in its basic economic, spatial, demographic and physical environment, 
and to cope with any adverse fiscal shocks which might occur. To date, however, research debate 
on local government financial indicators is somewhat limited (Guthrie, 1994; ASCPA, 
forthcoming).  Further, the introduction of Australian Accounting Standard 27 (AAS 27), 
‘Financial Reporting by Local Governments’, in 1992 has meant that comparable financial data 
across Australian local governments is now available with several years of  trends (ASCPA, 
forthcoming).  Given the current state of play, it would appear timely for academic contributions 
to the financial performance indicator debate. 
  
This paper aims to contribute to the performance indicator debate by suggesting what key 
financial performance indicators would be most suited to the needs of external stakeholders who 
cannot command special purpose reports, yet who may wish to assess the financial performance 
of individual local government councils.  Those that promoted the development and use of AAS 
27 statements argued that the information contained therein would provide external stakeholders 
with the information necessary to assess the financial performance of a council in managing its 
resources, and assess “whether the current activities of the Council are likely to impose 
obligations on future generations of ratepayers or taxpayers” (Greenall et al., 1988 p. 17).  If the 
justification for the introduction of accrual reporting is warranted,  the performance indicators 
need to be able to be derived from publicly available data from the accrual financial statements 
published by councils in accordance with AAS 27.  Further, the indicators recommended need to 
be robust enough to cater for the wide diversity in size of Australian local governments, and yet, 
the number of indicators needs to be relatively small (Carter, 1991; Atkinson and McCrindell, 
1997), as external users need to be able to assess the financial performance of the council 
reasonably easily. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows.  The next section examines the insights from relevant 
performance measurement literature with a view to placing the current study in context.  The 
following section examines the key dimensions of financial status and performance of local 
governments as argued by the promoters of accrual financial statements prepared in accordance 
with AAS 27.   The relevant performance indicators are then discussed.  The paper concludes 
with a discussion of the relevance of key performance indicators for local governments and 
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highlights areas for future research. 
 
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
 
There is a clear need to distinguish between the literature on performance management and that 
on performance measurement.  The focus of the performance management literature is usually on 
individual performance management or appraisal schemes and internal service delivery.  In this 
context, performance indicators are used by management to monitor the performance of an 
organisation over time, and to diagnose aspects of performance so that corrective action can be 
taken (Atkinson et al., 1997).   The focus of the performance measurement literature is on the 
measurement process, and the reporting of performance to external stakeholders, rather than how 
the information can be used to improve service delivery (Kloot, 1999; Kloot and Martin, 2000). 
 
To date, the majority of the public sector literature has focussed on the internal/management use 
of performance indicators to drive service delivery, rather than the external reporting of 
performance (Boyne and Law, 1991; Carter, 1989; Palmer, 1993; Meekings, 1995; Ammons, 
1995).  In this context, two themes are emerging from the literature.  First, it is widely recognised 
that performance measurement based primarily on financial performance measures lacks the 
“focus and robustness needed for internal management and control” (Atkinson et al., 1997, p. 
25).  Second, performance management in government is hampered because the internal 
indicators have become “too bountiful and operationally focused” (Atkinson and McCrindell, 
1997, p. 20).   
 
In an effort to provide a way forward, Atkinson and McCrindell (1997), argue that “while 
providing useful measures and indicators of performance for a multitude of services, government 
performance measurement systems do not generally provide a reliable means of assessing how 
well these services, and the individuals, groups and organisations that deliver them, contribute to 
the broader objectives and priorities of government.  This is why there continues to be 
dissatisfaction with accountability at the highest level – since performance measurement is the 
means of assessing accountability” (p. 20).  Ammons (1995, p. 37), supports these views by 
arguing that a focus on external stakeholders may lead to “meaningful advances in 
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performance measurement in local government”.  He suggests that while the focus of the 
performance indicator debate has been on management’s use of performance indicators to 
drive service delivery, changing the focus to external stakeholders such as citizens, and 
publishing measures that are not “esoteric and mundane” will capture media and citizen 
attention and prompt greater accountability and legislative oversight. 
 
The focus of this paper is on the development of broad financial indicators for a local 
government.  We agree with the prevailing view in the literature that performance indicators 
need to be developed for all key activities of a local government, and that there needs to be a 
mix of both financial and non financial measures (Kloot and Martin, 2000; Hydman et al., 
1993; AARF, 1996a; GASB, 1994; Van Peursem et al., 1995; Smith, 1995a).  Further, we 
recognise that a public sector agency which focuses only on financial goals will not survive 
unless it also takes into account its social goals (ASCPA, forthcoming).  However, as 
Hildreth (1996) argues, the fiscal agenda of a public organisation permeates all of its policies 
and programs.  At the broadest level it answers the question: Does the organisation have the 
financial capability to deliver the programs/outcomes now and in the future?  While local 
government accountability is wider than financial accountability, financial accountability is 
an essential element of local government finance (Midwinter and Monaghan, 1995; ASCPA, 
forthcoming). Kloot and Martin (2000) concur with this view when they report on interviews 
of 80 local government stakeholders in 7 local government councils in one Australian 
jurisdiction.  They report that in managing financial performance, councils were not merely 
concerned with pure cost measures. Other concepts of relevance were: debt reduction 
strategies; asset management; long term economic and social sustainability and equity in the 
provision of services across geographic areas and across social classes.  They conclude that 
financial performance is strongly linked to long term strategy, and “financial performance 
management is essential for long term survival in a context of reduced revenue and increased 
community expectations” (p. 28). The key dimensions of financial performance in the case of 
local governments are discussed in the next section.   
 
 
KEY DIMENSIONS OF FINANCIAL STATUS AND PERFORMANCE 
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AAS 27 was developed within the Australian accounting conceptual framework.  The basic 
premise of this framework is that users exist who need financial information in order to make 
decisions about an organisation.  These users are unable to demand special purpose financial 
reports (reports tailored for their needs) from an organisation, and thus rely on the provision of 
general purpose financial reports.  There are three categories of external user groups who are 
purported to use general purpose financial reports: resource providers (for example taxpayers, 
ratepayers and lenders); recipients of goods and services (taxpayers and ratepayers); and parties 
performing a review or oversight function (governments, regulatory agencies) (AARF 1992, 
pars., 16-20).   It is argued that these users principally need information for assessing the 
financial performance of the entity; that is, assessing the resources necessary to enable the entity 
to continue to provide services in the future and the likely cost of those services (AARF 1992, 
par.,  29).1 
 
In the case of the first category of users – resource providers (taxpayers, ratepayers and lenders), 
the Discussion Paper (Greenall et al., 1988, p. 15), and AAS 27 state that these users are 
primarily interested in whether the council is “financially sound; and, levying appropriate 
charges for the services provided”.  Measures of financial status and notions of equity should be 
able to be derived from the financial statements as these convey the primary financial 
information about the local council and, as such, should be able to satisfy these objectives.  The 
second category of users, recipients of goods and services were assumed to be interested in the 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness of the provision of services; and the extent to which 
benefits or services will continue to be provided, at what level and at what cost (Greenall et al., 
1988, p., 15). Notions of equity between geographical areas and generations are embedded here.  
Information on the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of the provision of services though, is 
best explained by non-financial/service indicators, and so are outside the scope of this paper.  
However, it should be noted that the decision on what community services to provide cannot be 
made on pure cost grounds; community benefits and community imperatives drive these 
                     
1  It is emphasised that categorisations of users of annual reports and the extent and purpose to which they make use 
of financial reports are largely normative in nature (Greenall et al., 1988, p. 13).  This is confirmed by the existing 
literature on users (see for example, Mayston, 1992). 
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decisions.  However, strong overall financial management of a council’s resources will ensure 
that the maximum funds are available for community priorities to be decided. In relation to the 
third group, parties performing an oversight function, the Discussion Paper states that in many 
cases they would be able to obtain special purpose reports, but they would primarily be interested 
in the level and costs of providing services, the extent to which those services are funded by 
rates, and that the council is “discharging their financial responsibilities to manage the resources 
under their control in the interests of present and future generations of the community” (Greenall 
et al., 1988, p. 16).   Again financial indicators can provide information on the extent to which 
services are funded by current period revenue, and the equity between present and future 
generations. 
 
In summary, the accounting model proposed for local governments assumed that external users 
of financial reports had common needs in terms of  “making judgements about the performance 
of the council in its management of financial resources, the resources necessary to support local 
government programs or activities”, and “whether current activities of the council are likely to 
impose obligations on future generations of ratepayers or taxpayers” (Greenall et al., 1988, p. 
17).  In other words, it was argued that users may need to make assessments about whether the 
local government is “financially sound; and is levying appropriate charges for the services 
provided” (Greenall et al., 1988, p. 15). 
 
The concept of ‘financial soundness’ is often called ‘fiscal sustainability’ or fiscal solvency 
(Hildreth, 1996; ASCPA, forthcoming).  Fiscal sustainability concerns the capacity to meet 
present and future levels of debt and other financial obligations within the organisation’s revenue 
constraints.  The concept of “levying appropriate charges for the services provided” in a period is 
really about the current generation fully paying for the cost of their services and is called 
‘intergenerational equity’.  Intergenerational equity is based upon the ‘golden rule’ that taxpayers 
in each time period should pay their way, in the sense that they should, as a group, pay for all 
expenditure from which they benefit, without requiring any subsidy from taxpayers in other time 
periods (Hildreth, 1996).  It is argued that if users are making assessments in these two key areas, 
then performance indicators should be developed in these areas.  The components of these two 
key dimensions of fiscal sustainability and intergenerational equity, and the ability of AAS 27 
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statements to provide this information will be examined in the next section. 
 
FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY 
 
Fiscal sustainability concerns the capacity of the organisation to meet present and future 
levels of debt and other financial obligations within the organisation’s revenue constraints. 
Fiscal sustainability indicators measure the financial flexibility of a council and, as such, 
provide an indication of the capacity of a council to respond to changing circumstances, 
including adverse financial shocks.  Liquidity is an important factor in the financial standing 
and stability of a council.  It measures a council’s ability to pay its short-term obligations as 
well as providing an indication of the viability of the council in the long-run.  The ASCPA 
argues, that there are three types of solvency indicators: coverage indicators; liquidity 
indicators and indebtedness measures (ASCPA, forthcoming).  Hildreth (1996), while 
recounting the US experiences in the case of New York City and Orange County also focuses 
on insolvency, that is, the problem which occurs when a government is unable to pay debts as 
they come due in the normal course of business.  However, while we agree that liquidity and 
indebtedness are important measures, and do measure solvency, we would argue that fiscal 
sustainability is broader.  In the case of Australian local government agencies, many are not 
reliant on raising all of their own income, the Local Government Grants Commission 
subsidizes their revenues and hence measures, which reflect this reliance, are also 
encompassed in fiscal sustainability.  Accordingly, fiscal sustainability measures encompass 
the following four dimensions: 
• own source revenue reliance  
• revenue flexibility/intensity 
• indebtedness 
• liquidity 
 
Own source revenue reliance 
 
One of the key indicators of a council to respond to changing circumstances is the extent to 
which a local government is dependent upon financial assistance from sources ‘external’ to 
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the council. This suggests that a key indicator of the flexibility of a council to respond to 
changing circumstances is the percentage of its revenue that is earned from its own-sources. 
While it is acknowledged that there will be significant differences in this measure between 
councils in different geographical and socio-economic regions, it is argued that a knowledge of 
this dimension of a local council’s fiscal sustainability is essential.  However, care will need to 
be taken in the use of this figure for comparative purposes between councils.  Trends of this 
indicator for one council over time may be more informative. 
 
Researchers (see MAV, 1993; Econosult, 1990) have argued that the best measure of this is to 
take rates revenue as a percentage of total revenue.  Indeed, this KPI is currently being proposed 
for use by councils in West Australia, Victoria, NSW and Tasmania (Industry Commission, 
1997).  However, two modifications are suggested in this paper.  First, it is argued that as local 
councils are subject to competitive pressures and are attempting to recover more of their costs 
through user charges, it is more meaningful to consider not merely rates, but all own-source 
revenue (that is, revenue from rates, fines, charges and interest).   A second modification is 
recommended to the denominator, total revenue.  This modification concerns the treatment of 
capital contributions (which includes capital grants from state and federal governments) adopted 
by the Australian accounting standard setters. It is acknowledged in Urgent Issues Group 
Abstract 11 that “contributions…usually involve significant resources and their treatment can 
have a material effect on the operating result and the assets and liabilities recognised in the 
statement of financial position (AARF 1996b, par., 3).  AAS 27 requires capital contributions to 
be treated as ordinary revenues in the period where control is obtained over the funds whether or 
not the conditions attaching to the grants have been fulfilled (par., 51).  It is noted that the 
Australian treatment is at odds with the treatment in the UK where the principle underlying 
SSAP4 is that grants should be credited to the Operating Statement on a basis that matches them 
with the expenditure they are intended to contribute towards.  This can be done by deducting the 
grant from the related fixed asset or by crediting the grant to deferred income (Accountancy 
1996, p. 80).   
 
In relation to the own-source revenue reliance measure, it can be argued that including capital 
contributions as revenue introduces a particularly volatile category of  ‘revenue’, and thus, for a 
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robust revenue measure it is argued that capital contributions where the conditions have not been 
met should be netted out.  
 
Thus the recommended own-source revenue reliance ratio would be: 
 
 Own-Source Revenue 
 Total  Revenue (less capital conditions where conditions have not been met) 
 
This ratio gives an indication of how dependent some councils are on financial assistance from 
sources “external” to the council and its local community.   It is argued that the Australian 
treatment of capital contributions as revenue means that this performance indicator cannot be 
easily obtained from AAS 27 statements.  A user may need to obtain the information on capital 
contributions from the notes to the accounts, and hence make the necessary adjustments. 
  
Revenue Flexibility/Intensity 
 
While it is argued that it is useful for users to appreciate the extent to which a council relies on its 
own revenue, as a complementary measure, it may also be desirable to have some indication of 
the extent to which a council is capable of raising additional revenue if it was encountering, for 
example, an unanticipated fiscal shock.  Generically, this type of indicator would desirably take 
the form of a ratio of actual revenue to the revenue base, where the latter term refers to some 
indicator of potential revenue.  Such a measure also provides an indicator of the present intensity 
of the revenue raising effort, and may therefore be referred to here as a revenue intensity 
measure. 
 
At a national level, the ratio of revenue to Gross Domestic Product is such an indicator.   The use 
of GDP as a proxy for the revenue base may be justified at the national level by the broad tax 
bases available to national governments.  It also illustrates a problem with the proxy i.e., the 
limits to taxation are ultimately political⎯they reflect the extent to which it might be politically 
feasible for government to increase tax rates.  The political limits to taxation are, however, not 
measurable, and in any event vary considerably (in a fiscal crisis, it may be feasible for a 
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government to raise taxes beyond the levels which would be politically acceptable in more 
normal times).  GDP is clearly only an approximate indicator of the tax base, but it is not 
necessarily easy to improve on it. 
 
At the sub-national level, using a GDP-type measure (ie., regional income) as a proxy for the tax 
base is considerably less justifiable in view of the narrower revenue base (ie., the much more 
limited revenue raising powers available to a local government).  Identifying a suitable proxy for 
the tax base is therefore problematic.  In so far as local government relies upon a range of 
different revenue types, and, under current trends is increasingly more likely to do so, it would be 
useful to have some type of composite revenue base measure.  At present, however, no such 
measure appears to be available.  This is an area where further work would be useful. 
 
In the absence of a composite revenue base measure, it is argued that the rating base which is 
used by a particular jurisdiction would be a suitable proxy.  Thus, the Unimproved Capital 
Value (UCV), or Capital Improved Value (CIV) of rated properties would be used. Turning 
to the numerator, the increasing diversification of revenue raising sources for local 
governments arguably makes it more useful to consider, in this context, not merely actual 
rates revenue, but total own source revenue raising (where own source revenue is defined as 
rates, fines, user charges (including utility charges) and interest revenue).  This suggests the 
following revenue intensity indicator: 
 
 Own-Source Revenue 
 UCV or CIV 
 
This measure is clearly far from perfect.  UCV or CIV may be an imperfect indicator of the rates 
revenue base, in so far as it may not always be well correlated with the ratepayer’s capacity to 
pay.   However, notwithstanding these limitations, it is argued that a measure of revenue 
flexibility is crucial to the evaluation of the financial status of a local government by external 
users.  Clearly, the information on own source revenue can be derived from AAS 27 statements, 
but information concerning the rating base is non-financial information and currently not 
disclosed in the annual reports of local governments.  This indicator is a good example of the 
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intricacies of public sector performance measures, where information is not able to be obtained 
from generic financial statements. 
 
Indebtedness 
 
An important dimension of the fiscal sustainability of any organisation, whether public or private 
sector, relates to the level of its financial commitments. As Hildreth (1996) argues, any 
organisation wanting to remain a going concern needs to have and maintain sufficient assets 
to cover its liabilities. Indebtedness is a measure of this.  Taken by themselves, however, 
absolute levels of debt (or its flow equivalent, interest payments) indicate very little.  It is 
measures of debt in relation to servicing capacity which are important. For this reason, in the 
private sector context, interest cover, which is measured by taking earnings before interest 
and tax as a ratio of interest expense is commonly used as a measure of servicing capacity.  
 
The public sector (or at least the non-commercial component of the public sector) is very 
different from the private sector.  Profit maximisation is not an objective, so that scaling debt or 
interest in relation to some profit-type (operating surplus) measure would make little sense.2  The 
tax/rates revenue upon which the non-commercial public sector depends are compulsory, 
involuntary charges, and are a discretionary policy choice variable in the way that price is not.  
Governments can, in other words, choose to vary the level of such revenue within broad 
parameters set by the revenue base.3  Moreover, because government services are not sold 
(which is the corollary of funding through involuntary revenue flows), the outlays involved in 
providing these services may, if necessary in a crisis, be diverted to debt servicing in a way 
which is not true of production costs in the private sector.4  This means that measures of interest 
or debt in relation to operating surplus are not particularly meaningful, and that the best measure 
                     
2 In simple accounting terms, the accrual operating balance before interest is the counterpart of earnings before 
interest (EBI).  It is not, however, a variable of any policy significance.  Profit maximisation is not an objective.  As 
suggested below, intergenerational equity requires a zero accrual operating balance. 
 
3 Moreover, to the considerable extent that public enterprises are monopolies which retain a measure of unexploited 
discretionary pricing power, the same also is true of the commercial public sector. 
 
4 An obvious exception to this is tied grants from other governments. 
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of debt or interest in relation to debt servicing capacity is given by debt or interest as a proportion 
of the revenue base, because it is the revenue base which provides a measure of the capacity to 
service debt.  Hence the standard use, at the national level, of the debt to Gross Domestic Product 
ratio.  At the local government level, however, the problem concerning the deficiencies of the 
available proxies for the revenue base again arises.  Under these circumstances, and given that 
this measure is to be reported with revenue intensity measures, perhaps the best approach is to 
report debt levels in relation to a measure of actual revenue.  As previously discussed, own-
source revenue is a more robust figure than total revenue in the current circumstances in which 
local governments find themselves. 
 
This suggests the following as the best indicator of fiscal sustainability in relation to financial 
commitments: 
 
 Debt 
 Own-source Revenue 
 
In this case, the debt information can be obtained from the AAS 27 statement, and the own-
source revenue can be derived from the notes to the accounts.  External users would be able to 
calculate, or verify this component of fiscal sustainability. 
 
Liquidity indicators 
 
Liquidity ratios measure a council's ability to pay its short term obligations from its current assets 
and are an indication of the viability of the Council in the short-run.   Probably the best known 
measure of liquidity is the current ratio, which is calculated by dividing current assets by current 
liabilities. 
 
The aim of the current ratio is to assess an organisation’s ability to meet its current obligations 
when they fall due in the short term.  It is essential that an organisation keep adequate liquid 
funds on hand to meet its normal commitments.  This ensures that the organisation can continue 
operating smoothly on a day-to-day basis without having to be concerned about its ability to 
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have the ready cash to pay short-term commitments such as payroll.  In the case of local 
government, given available data, this is also an attractive indicator of liquidity. Indeed, Hildreth 
(1996) argues that if measures such as this had been in use, New York City may have had earlier 
warnings of liquidity problems in the 1970s. 
 
However, the treatment of capital contributions mandated by the Australian accounting standard 
setters again poses a problem.  Where local government bodies receive capital grants and 
contributions tied to specific capital works, these are funds which are not freely available to pay 
liabilities.  As such, it is suggested that it would be appropriate to adopt a modified current ratio 
wherein current assets are reduced by the balance of tied capital grants and contributions not yet 
expended.   
 
The suggested liquidity indicator would then be: 
Modified current ratio:  Current Assets – Capital contributions not yet expended 
     Current Liabilities 
 
Again, external users of AAS 27 statements would need to make modifications to reported 
figures to be able to calculate this ratio. 
 
In summary, in relation to fiscal sustainability indicators, the AAS 27 general purpose financial 
reports do not easily provide external users/stakeholders with the information needed to assess 
this aspect of financial performance.  However, much of the information can be obtained by 
recasting the statements. 
 
INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY INDICATORS 
 
The issue of intergenerational equity is an important consideration for all levels of government, 
including local governments (OECD 1993, p.12).  Indeed it was one of the primary motivations 
advanced by the Public Sector Accounting Standards Board (PSASB) for the introduction of 
accrual accounting for local governments (Greenall et al., 1988), and is considered to be a key 
dimension of the financial status and performance of a local council. 
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The Joint Committee of Public Accounts (JCPA) states that a balance in treatment across 
generations to avoid excessive net expenditure on the current generation at the expense of 
future generations is a key element of an appropriate fiscal policy (JCPA, 1995).  As noted 
above, intergenerational equity is based upon the ‘golden rule’ that taxpayers in each time period 
should pay their way, in the sense that they should, as a group, pay for all expenditure from 
which they benefit, without requiring any subsidy from taxpayers in other time periods.  This 
translates into the proposition that taxes should be sufficient both to cover all current expenditure 
and to meet the costs of the use of the public infrastructure assets which were constructed in the 
past (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1973; Hildreth, 1996).   Thus, each yearly set of taxpayers 
should pay its own way and neither push the burden for current services onto a future taxpaying 
generation, or accumulate a balance which accrues to the benefit of a future generation (Hildreth, 
1996). The intergenerational equity principle requires that the initial cost (in real dollar terms) of 
long-lived social assets should be amortised gradually over time in line with the manner in which 
the benefits from those assets accrue.  There is a close link between this traditional concept and 
accrual accounting (Robinson 1996, 1999b). 
 
The precise accounting implications of the golden rule have been explored elsewhere (Robinson, 
1998).  In short, if the appropriate accrual methodology is employed, the ‘golden rule’ requires a 
zero accrual operating balance (where the operating balance refers to revenues minus 
expenses).  The golden rule calls, in other words, for a balanced accrual budget.  While 
conventional depreciation and asset valuation methodologies differ somewhat from the most 
conceptually appropriate forms, the operating balance measure which they generate may be 
regarded as a useful approximation for this purpose (Robinson, 1998).  Moreover, while 
intergenerational equity is often spoken of as requiring the maintenance of a constant net worth 
(where net worth refers to assets minus liabilities), it is more accurate to think of it as requiring a 
zero accrual operating balance (Robinson, 1998, 1999b).5 This is because valuation effects can 
induce volatile discontinuities into the balance sheet, whereas the operating statements will be 
isolated from these. 
                     
5 There are, of course, various events which break the articulation between balance sheets and operating statements.  
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The intergenerational equity position should not be confused with the debt position, nor more 
generally with the fiscal sustainability measures discussed above.  Increases in debt may be 
compatible with intergenerational equity (Robinson, 1996) and, conversely, intergenerational 
equity may be breached without increases in debt.  If debt is used to defer the costs of present 
service delivery to the future, the intergenerational equity principle is breached.  However, this is 
not the case if debt is used exclusively to defer costs which pertain to future service provision, as 
in the case of a debt-financed increases in the stock of capital assets.  If, on the other hand, debt 
levels are kept constant but the asset base is permitted to erode (either through poor maintenance 
or failure to replace obsolete or worn out assets), the intergenerational equity principle will have 
been breached because this must mean that current ratepayers have not been meeting the capital 
costs (depreciation, etc.) associated with the assets used to provide them with services. 
 
In relation to measures of intergenerational equity, the treatment of capital contributions needs to 
be examined.  As noted above, AAS 27 requires capital contributions to be treated as ordinary 
revenues when they are controlled.  More precisely, they require all contributions to be treated as 
revenue, irrespective of whether they have conditions attached to them or not.  The rationale for 
this appears to hinge upon the fact that ‘contributions’, as defined in the accounting standards, 
are ‘non-reciprocal’; in other words, they create no liabilities or obligations on the part of the 
recipient entity (AARF 1996a, par., 64-70).   The logic of this would be clear enough in a 
private-sector context, where it would be entirely reasonable to treat grants which impose no 
obligations as adding to profits.  However, in the public sector, the operating balance does not 
measure profit, but intergenerational equity.  To treat all contributions as revenue while applying 
the golden rule principle of a zero operating balance is, in effect, to say that when, for example, a 
state government grant or private donation is made to a local government, the appropriate 
revenue contribution of ratepayers in the time period when the grant/donation is received ought 
to be lowered by the amount of the grant/donation.  This would mean that current-period 
ratepayers would derive the total benefit from the grant/donation, and future ratepayers would 
derive no benefit.  This would be reasonable enough if, for example, the grant in question is an 
ordinary general revenue grant.  But if the grant is explicitly of a capital nature (ie., intended to 
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finance some long-lived asset), it is reasonable to assume that the grantor intends the benefits of 
the grant to be enjoyed not merely by current-period ratepayers, but by future ratepayers as well. 
 This reasoning suggests that, notwithstanding the accounting standards, it is inappropriate to 
treat capital contributions as revenue.  It is therefore proposed that capital contributions should 
be deducted from operating balances reported under AAS 27, so as to yield what is referred to as 
the ‘adjusted’ operating balance. 
 
Intergenerational equity thus requires a zero ‘adjusted’ operating balance.  Non-zero adjusted 
operating balances indicate a breach of the intergenerational equity principle: a negative adjusted 
operating balance indicates that current taxpayers are not paying their way, while a positive 
balance indicates current taxpayers are being ‘overcharged’ for their use of assets.  When 
developing indicators for local government in general, diversity in size of governments needs to 
be considered, in order to get some indication of the relative magnitude of any such departures 
from the golden rule.  For this purpose, once again, some scaling factor is required.  One 
commendable option is total operating costs.   Thus, the suggested measure of intergenerational 
equity is: 
 
 ‘Adjusted’ Operating Balance 
 Total Operating Costs 
 
It is of interest to note that given the diverse range of financial performance indicators currently 
being reported, or proposed to be reported, this aspect of intergenerational equity is generally 
ignored.  The only exception to this is the current requirements in Victoria which require 
councils, starting in 1999, to show a “financial health” indicator, where operating surplus/deficit 
is calculated as a percentage of total recurrent revenue.6  While it is encouraging that this 
important concept of intergenerational equity has received some attention, it should be noted that 
failure to adjust the operating balance for capital items can result in a misleading indication of 
the maintenance of intergenerational equity through time. 
 
                     
6 Using costs as a denominator may be preferable for a number of reasons including its lesser susceptibility to 
cyclical fluctuations in the economy.  Recurrent revenue is, moreover, a cash accounting concept, and arguably does 
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CONCLUSION  
 
Performance measurement systems aim to develop and publish data which enables informed 
judgements to be made about various aspects of an organisation’s operations.  This is an ideal 
goal, and performance assessment is problematic (Midwinter 1994).  Nevertheless, in spite of 
the problems, it is important not to reject the principle (Smith 1995b).  It is widely agreed 
that any measures of performance should take into account financial and non-financial 
aspects. The financial performance indicator debate provides the broad context within which 
service delivery occurs (Ammons 1995). Financial indicators assist with the strategic level of 
performance assessment by allowing long term decisions about resource allocation to be 
made and hence social objectives to be achieved (Osborne et al., 1995). As the future success 
and value of local government to local communities in terms of the services and facilities it 
provides will be determined, in part, by their financial viability, users external to local 
government authorities need to be able to make decisions based on publicly available 
information. Stakeholders can be empowered in their decision making when they know the 
financial health of their local government.  This is particularly apparent when it is recognised 
that many local councils have suffered from ‘fiscal stress’ which results from the twin 
pressure of increasing service needs and falling revenues (Boyne, 1988).  
 
Research debate on relevant financial performance indicators for local governments is scant.  
This paper has aimed to contribute to this debate, by suggesting a group of performance 
indicators that may be useful in assessing the financial performance of local governments. The 
accounting profession promoted AAS 27 statements as a key document to discharge financial 
performance accountabilities, particularly with respect to the management of financial resources 
necessary to support programs, and whether the current activities of the council are likely to 
impose obligations on future generations of ratepayers or taxpayers. However, not all of the 
relevant financial indicators can be derived from these statements. An assessment of the financial 
condition of a local council is as much about measuring the existing financial condition as it is 
about measuring the potential for financial stress in the future.  Local government performance 
indicators need to be diverse, because local government activities cover the spectrum of activities 
                                                                
not sit well with the accrual operating balance measure. 
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ranging from trading enterprises to provision of budget funded social programs (ASCPA, 
forthcoming).  It is consequently not surprising that some of the information for the development 
of suitable financial indicators is not available from the published AAS 27 statements.  
Moreover, it was argued that the Australian accounting policies in relation to the recognition of 
capital contributions meant that extensive adjustments need to be made to the AAS 27 financial 
information in order that relevant performance indicators can be obtained.  Of even greater 
significance was the argument advanced in this paper that the notion of the intergenerational 
equity issues in local government accounting has not featured prominently in the accounting 
debate, or in the performance indicator debate.  The notion of intergenerational equity is an 
important consideration for all levels of government (OECD, 1993).  However, as Broadbent 
(1995) argues, one of the features of performance measurement is that what is measured 
becomes ‘visible’.  It could be argued then, that intergenerational equity will only become visible 
if it is measured.  The accounting figures can provide a measure of intergenerational equity, and 
this is significant as resource allocation and social policy debate may be enhanced by 
consideration of intergenerational equity issues. 
 
The current research has limitations.  The  researchers’ objective has been to develop a small set 
of indicators which can be of use to external users.  By the very nature of this objective, detailed 
information which can be obtained from a whole suite of indicators may have been sacrificed.  
The area of local government performance indicators is one that requires more research.  Indeed, 
detailed modelling of the indicators recommended for both small and larger councils across 
geographical boundaries and over time would be a fruitful area for further research. 
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